When applied to cases of disagreement with peers, the first-rate evidence is evidence that directly relates to the proposal at issue, and any peer opinion on the proposal at issue is evidence of a higher order (this is evidence that the first-rate evidence supports the respective positions). Other objections to the “equal weight” opinion are not related to another specific view of differences of opinion, and some are more than mere “equal weight” view. In this section, we briefly examine some of these objections. The phenomenon of differences of opinion is therefore a skeptical threat: for many of our valued convictions. If we are not protected, we know that there are many controversies about these beliefs, even among the smartest people who have worked the hardest to discover the truth of the matter. There is good reason to believe that it is irrational to keep faith in this kind of controversy in the face of this kind of controversy, and a belief that is irrational is not knowledge. It follows that our convictions, which we recognize as controversial, are not limited to knowledge. This is the threat of disagreements of skepticism (Frances 2018, 2013, 2005; Christensen 2009; 2010 Smoke; Goldberg 2009, 2013b; Kornblith 2010, 2013; Lammenranta 2011, 2013; Machuca 2013). A related point is that these consequences are doxastic consequences. Disagreement was disputed that beliefs are/are rational and what changes in confidence are not rational. Disagreement is not a view of the points of view to be defended or the theses to be pursued. In connection with the standard of knowledge of the assertion or standard of knowledge of the action, the skepticism of the opinion would have other consequences on the claims that can be invoked or exchanged, but these consequences are only the result of such a combination of views. However, the vast majority of the literature on the epistimographic importance of disagreements concerns the recognized disagreements of their peers (for disagreements with superiors, see Frances 2013).
We are now getting to that point. Here are the questions for agreement/disagreement plus levels of conviction: A child has faith that hell is a real place in the middle of the earth. You do not agree. This is a case where you disagree with someone you recognize as your epistemic subordinate in the question of whether ” (B) is true. They think Babe Ruth was the greatest baseball player of all time. We learn that a sports writer, who has written several books on the history of baseball, disagrees and says that somehow it was the greatest. In this case, you will notice that you do not agree with an epistemic superior in this matter, because you know that you are only an amateur when it comes to baseball. In a third case, you do not agree with your sister about the name of the city that visited your family on vacation when you were a child. You know from long experience that your memory in cases like this is about as reliable as you; it is a disagreement with a recognized epistemic peer.
Finally, independence was theoretically motivated by examining the type of argument that would be allowed to be rejected. In particular, a refusal of independence was envisaged to allow a problematic type of begging, allowing him to use his own reasoning to conclude that his colleague is wrong. Something doesn`t seem to be in order with the following reasoning: “My peer doesn`t believe- (P), but I`ve concluded that my peer is wrong” or “I thought”(S” was my peer, but “S” doesn`t think(P), and I think that ” (P) is not my peer” (see Christensen (2011). Independence forbids both, to block reason, to believe that you are mistaken in discovering disagreement.